The Iranian Dream

Ramin Jahanbegloo: The Iranian Dream

THE ONGOING protests in the streets of Iran and the social and political developments that followed the presidential elections are reminders of a century-long quest for democracy and three decades of struggle for republican values against theological rule in the Iranian public sphere. Not since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 have such large-scale demonstrations taken place in Iran. Tens of thousands of young Iranians, women, students, artists, intellectuals, and ordinary people have been assembling and rallying in the Iranian cities defying the governmental restrictions and challenging the security forces and the paramilitary groups. This does not mean that another revolution is around the corner, despite the wishful thinking of a few non-Iranians. But it does mean that the Islamic Republic of Iran is now facing a deep crisis of legitimacy, with the foundations of its theocratic rule and the entire political system set up by the revolution thirty years ago called into question.

The deeper challenge facing Iran’s political structure and its future is a serious division that has emerged among the architects of the Islamic republic. The Iranian Revolution did not stop after February 1979 any more than the French Revolution stopped after July 1789 or August 1792 or the Russian Revolution concluded in February or October 1917. Having achieved the single unifying aim of overthrowing the Shah and founding an Islamic state, each party tried to grab as much political power—and social and economic interests—as possible. As such, in the past thirty years, the republican nature of the Iranian revolution with an emphasis on the role of the citizens in the public space was increasingly abandoned in favor of a political theology that legitimized the ruling clique. But until this day, it was possible for the majority of Iranians to go on living, despite all the political failures and human rights violations, with a whole series of structures inherited from the revolution of 1979.

For thirty years, Iranian politics has suffered from a hidden power struggle that has hampered the Iranian political system. But the events following this year’s elections have widened the division between the political factions in Iran, making it even harder for the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, to handle the crisis and find a common ground. As a result, unrest in Iran may escalate in the next few weeks, although there is no sign of the regime’s collapse. As a matter of fact, Iran’s Islamic regime has survived a devastating war with Iraq, strong American sanctions and international isolation in its thirty years of power. Iran’s political system does not appear in immediate danger.

But the ruling elites—and more specifically the quietist clergy and Grand Ayatollahs in the holy cities of Qom and Mashhad—are paying close attention to the anger in the streets. They do not forget that the same type of popular unrest they organized themselves three decades ago brought down the Pahlavi regime. As for the protestors, most of them are from a generation that missed the downfall of the Shah and much of the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary rule. But these “rebels without cause” are taking to the streets of Tehran clamoring for change and making themselves heard. One should not forget that in today’s Iran, two out of three people are under thirty and they make up one-third of eligible voters in presidential elections. It is true, however, that these youngsters pose little immediate threat to a regime, which has, at its disposal, vast paramilitary and police resources as well as significant rural political base.

But given the demographic nature of the Iranian public space, any future decision that disregards the hopes and opinions of the young Iranians would risk severely the very foundation on which the Islamic regime stands. Should that happen, the Supreme Leader has the sole constitutional authority to declare martial law. This would make things even more difficult, showing the failure of Iran’s political system to defuse a crisis and to re-run the elections.

This appears to be one of the scenarios that might happen in the next few days. The other, the decision to call for a new election, would almost certainly also cause an enormous amount of embarrassment for the Iranian political establishment and create more disruption and violence among the ranks of Ahmadinejad’s supporters. In both cases there is a risk of violent repression and a loss of credibility for those in charge in Iran.

The ultimate question, however, remains: If the Iranian political system cannot be reformed in a peaceful and nonviolent way and through the ballot box, then what is left of the Iranian dream of democracy? Maybe Iranians will have to wait another generation for this dream to become reality.

Ramin Jahanbegloo is a well-known Iranian-Canadian philosopher. Presently a Professor of Political Science and a Research Fellow in the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto, he is the author of twenty books in English, French, and Persian, including Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (Peter Halban, 1992), Gandhi: Aux Sources de la Nonviolence ( Felin, 1999), Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity (Lexington Books, 2004), and most recently The Spirit of India (Penguin 2008).

Photo: Tehran, June 16 (Milad Avazbeigi / Creative Commons / Wikipedia Commons)