Sri Lankan Government Hardens its Position as the War Winds Down

S. Senanayake: The Crisis in Sri Lanka

RECENT FIGHTING in Sri Lanka’s northeast between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was some of the bloodiest in recent memory. In two days of heavy shelling, the only functioning hospital in the war zone was struck twice, killing an estimated 100 people and wounding scores of others. As usual, both sides have denied responsibility in what is becoming an increasingly cruel war.

In “Sri Lanka’s Intractable Conflict” (Feb. 6), I stressed that the Sri Lankan government cannot end the twenty six-year conflict through military means, but needs to reach a political solution to address the decades-old grievances of the minority Tamil community. A political settlement, based on a power-sharing agreement with minority communities, offers the best hope for achieving national reconciliation and long-term peace. Unfortunately, it has become increasingly clear that the government seeks a military solution. The government also seemed to be moving towards a more hardline Sinhalese agenda, with scant indications that it is planning to address the underlying issues that led to the rise of militant organizations such as the LTTE.

Currently, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) has surrounded the last remaining vestiges of the LTTE in a small five square km area of beach and coconut groves in the country’s northeast. Along with the several hundred LTTE fighters, there are, by the UN’s estimation, more than 50,000 Tamil civilians. Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch have repeatedly accused the LTTE of using the civilians as human shields and in some instances forcibly conscripting civilians to take up arms against the advancing SLA.

In turn, the LTTE and rights groups have accused the SLA of repeatedly shelling civilians in government-designated “no fire zones”. While the government has denied the accusations, it has on occasion contradicted itself by denying that it had used heavy weapons in the no fire zones only to say weeks later that it would immediately cease using these weapons in areas heavily populated by civilians. The UN has warned that if the SLA carries out a final assault against the LTTE, a “bloodbath” will most likely occur.

The international community has urged the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive and to allow the trapped civilians to flee the besieged area. The government has steadfastly refused such calls, claiming that any pause in the fighting would allow LTTE cadres to escape. In fact, the repeated calls by the international community have only hardened the government’s resolve to move forward with its military operation to crush the LTTE despite the mounting human toll.

Hardline advocates of the war, namely Sinhalese nationalists, accuse the international community, particularly the West, of interfering in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. Following an April 29 visit by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to press Colombo for an immediate ceasefire, the Sinhalese nationalist party Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party or JHU) held a protest outside the British High Commission. JHU leaders accused Miliband of being a LTTE sympathizer and coming to Colombo to help LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Prior to the diplomatic visit, the JHU-aligned National Movement Against Terrorism plastered areas of Colombo with “wanted” posters carrying images of Miliband, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Norwegian politician Erik Solheim, accusing them of “aiding and abetting terrorism.” Although the JHU only has nine seats in the 225-seat parliament, it is a partner in the ruling coalition government and thus has greater influence than its seats suggest.

Much of the existing Sri Lankan media has also been incensed by the international criticism over the government’s handling of the military offensive, with editorials accusing the West of kowtowing to LTTE supporters. The United States has especially been singled out for its perceived double standard for carrying out its war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but chastising the Sri Lankan government as it teeters on the brink of eradicating its own terrorist menace, the LTTE—a group labeled a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and Canada.

But the dearth of dissenting views in the Sri Lankan media is more due to fear of reprisal from the state than a sense of patriotic zeal. The government does not tolerate dissent from journalists and media outlets that criticize its operation against the LTTE–and those who do are ruthlessly suppressed.

My uncle, a doctor, lamented to me of a lost friendship with a well-known Sunday Times defense columnist. He had received a phone call from the columnist’s wife, saying that he could no longer maintain contact with him because he was being followed and feared that further contact would endanger my uncle. According to a January 2009 Amnesty International report, at least fourteen media workers have been unlawfully killed since the beginning of 2006 and more than 20 journalists have fled the country because of threats. One of the most widely reported incidents was the murder of Lasantha Wikrematunga, editor of the English-language Sunday Leader, who was shot by unknown gunmen in Colombo. In an editorial written by Wikrematunga and published posthumously, he accused the government for his death.*

The Sri Lankan government, meanwhile, has framed the military offensive as a massive humanitarian mission, dubbing it the “the world’s largest hostage rescue operation.” State-run newspapers carry color inserts documenting the SLA’s operations to free the thousands of trapped Tamil civilians in LTTE-held areas. A government-run television station carried the latest events from the front lines with embedded Sinhalese journalists, and began its nightly coverage with a flashy opening sequence titled, “the countdown to victory.”

While praise is heaped upon the military, there is virtually no mention in the mainstream Sri Lankan press of the fate of Tamil civilians after they are “liberated” in the northeast. Most are placed in “welfare centers” that are nothing more than open-air prisons. The camps have a significant military presence with the residents cut off from the outside world. Many residents are separated from family members and unable to obtain information on the fate of their relations. The government originally proposed holding the refugees in the camps for up to three years, but after protests by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the government plans to resettle 80 percent of the refugees by the end of the year.

Colombo is also festooned with posters and billboards praising the heroic efforts of the Sri Lankan armed forces. A smiling image of President Mahinda Rajapaksa accompanies many of the placards. One of the most striking aspects of these placards is that they are almost entirely in Sinhala, with a few exceptions in English. I did not come across a single poster in Tamil. Even in the majority Tamil neighborhoods, such as Wellawatta often referred to as “Little Jaffna,” there was a suspicious absence of propaganda posters in Tamil.

The Sinhala-only posters are a disturbing indication that the government is framing the imminent military victory not as a unifying moment for all Sri Lankans, but a triumph solely for the majority Sinhalese. Unfortunately, at a crucial time at which the government should make efforts to reach out to the Tamil community to win the peace, it instead continues to further alienate them.

But anyone who questions whether the government’s military campaign is popular with the voting public only has to look at the results of the April 25 Western Provincial Council elections, which includes Colombo. Rajapaksa’s ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance swept the polls with 67 percent of the total votes cast, giving it sixty eight seats in the 104-member council. The elections were seen as a referendum on the government’s military campaign against the LTTE and with a resounding victory, there is speculation that Rajapaksa will capitalize on the popularity of his war strategy and call for early presidential elections for some time in the end of 2009.

The prevailing hope in Colombo seems to be that with the war nearing an end, the country may begin a new era of peace and prosperity. Indeed during a May 7 address to diplomats in Colombo, Rajapaksa said, “At long last we are on a threshold of defeating terrorism and facing a new era of lasting peace and security for all Sri Lankans.”

While the war may be at an end, peace and prosperity may still seem a distant dream. The SLA’s bombardment of the northeast has led to scores of civilian casualties and has incensed the large and well-mobilized Tamil diaspora in Canada, Europe and the United States—which has been crucial in providing financial support to the LTTE. Without a viable alternative from the Sri Lankan government that recognizes the rights and aspirations of all Sri Lankans regardless of ethnic or religious identity, the bloody siege of the northeast will not end the current conflict, but sow the seeds of a future one.

Sumedha Senanayake is the Middle East/North Africa analyst at iJET International, a risk consultancy, and recently returned from a trip to Sri Lanka. He is Sinhalese.

* I gave several copies of my previous Dissent article to friends and relatives in Colombo. Quite a few people warned me that if the article was published in Sri Lanka, I may have gotten a visit from the “white van”, a reference to the vehicle the government allegedly uses to abduct and disappear perceived enemies of the state.

Photographs are both taken by the author. The first is a Sinhala poster in Colombo that reads: “You are heroes in this country. To the saviors of our nation, we salute you.” The second is another Colombo poster from the JHU-aligned National Movement Against Terrorism.