The Militarization of Fidelismo

The Militarization of Fidelismo

When René Dumont published the book Cuba: Est-Il Socialiste? earlier this year in France, it created a sensation throughout Europe. A distinguished agronomist who occupies a chair at the Institut National Agronomique in Paris, Dumont (born 1904) is also a veteran French leftist who had paid several visits as an expert adviser to and sympathizer with Castro’s Cuba. His richly detailed portrait of economic mismanagement and militarization is all the more devastating because it comes from a friend of the regime. This portrait has recently been confirmed by Castro himself, who, as the New York Times reports on July 26, 1970, “drew a bleak picture of the Cuban economy, with conditions in many sectors bordering on chaos.” Nothing more need be said here except that in our judgment Dumont offers further evidence for the view that without democratic criticism, institutions, and opposition, no society can be built on socialist lines. This first English translation of lengthy sections from Cuba: Est II Socialiste? is published by arrangement with Georges Borchardt, Inc., and reprinted by permission of Editions du Seuil, 1970. Our title has been supplied by the editor.—ED.

 

During the first few days I was in Cuba in late June 1969, I believed that an imminent transition to a communism without marked privations was feasible. I did continue to register very explicit reservations about the projected 15 percent annual increase in agricultural products, which was to be spread over a twelve-year period. Yet in the course of the six-and-a-half- hour tour I made with Fidel Castro on the afternoon and evening of Sunday, June 29, his assurances were rather convincing. … That night, however, when, in the euphoric start of my visit, I said to Fidel that perhaps he was going to beat all records for agricultural progress in the socialist world, he seemed to hesitate. “You think so?” he said; then, with that sincerity of which he is sometimes still capable, he added, “You know, a revolution is hard.” It was a courageous admission.

 

At the outset, let me emphasize that in Cuba one does not encounter the extreme poverty of some parts of Mexico, numerous regions in northeast Brazil, or much of the Andes region, from Columbia and Peru to Bolivia. No one in Cuba is very hungry; nonetheless, austerity is widespread, and food shortages are again as severe as they were in 1962, if not more so.

The basic food rations are very cheap. Wages have been raised, and most Cubans have more money than they can spend. They hardly want to save or invest it, nor are they encouraged to do so, for one would have to promise them interest—a heretical promise. They all want to spend their money, and quickly, but have very few opportunities to do so. When the occasion does arise, everyone rushes to the scene and the lines grow longer and longer. Here, too, a big ...