After the Albany Coup: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It

After the Albany Coup: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It

Sarah Leonard: After the Albany Coup

IN A state known for intractable legislative gridlock and feckless governors, a handful of elected officials and one billionaire spent the last month pushing the limits of government dysfunction. New York State Senators Pedro Espada, Jr. (D-Queens) and Hiram Monserrate (D-Queens) formed a coalition with the Republican caucus on June 8 and flipped control of their chamber. They claimed to seek ethics reform and a more prominent place for Hispanic legislators, but they effectively stopped progress on legislation affecting county taxes, rent control, and other vital issues.

Monserrate quickly returned to the Democratic fold, while Espada claimed to be President pro tempore of the Senate during the thirty-one day standoff. The two men suffer from a range of legal problems, which likely provided the opening for cooperation with billionaire Tom Golisano (although the businessman claims that he will not be footing the legislators’ legal bills) who quickly claimed partial responsibility for the coup. During the last election cycle, Golisano aided Democrats in gaining a Senate majority, but unhappy with their legislative progress and outraged by tax increases, he encouraged the recent defection.

Now that Espada’s political pendulum has swung again, returning power to the senate’s Democratic caucus, it would be easy to be grateful for the respite from embarrassing reminders of a corrupt and incompetent government. Espada himself is accused of using his non-profit organizations as political slush funds, and he recently turned in long overdue campaign finance forms only under threat of criminal prosecution (his forms miraculously showed no money being spent in the midst of last year’s heated campaign). Monserrate has been indicted for slashing his girlfriend’s face with glass and the New York Times lists about fifteen other current or recent New York state lawmakers who are in jail or have been charged with crimes ranging from bribe-taking to assault.

The legislature was riddled with corruption long before the 2008 election gave senate Democrats a majority. Joe Bruno, the Republican senate majority Leader from 1994 to 2008, has been indicted on eight felony counts of corruption and is paying for his defense with campaign donations. Tom Golisano–the preening billionaire and three-time gubernatorial candidate who recently moved to Florida to avoid paying New York taxes–runs a complex web of political organizations designed to funnel his money to New York “reform” candidates. Currently, the transactions of political action organizations controlled by Golisano and his top aide, Steven Pigeon, are being investigated for illegally distributing money to political campaigns. In one case, Golisano gave over $900,000 to a single candidate.

This grotesque cast of characters may put the frustrated voter in mind of New York’s Tammany Hall days. But these individuals are not what is wrong with our government; they are symptoms of a long untreated disease. It is not in every state that a resentful billionaire like Tom Golisano can make a plaything of the legislature.

THE TWO fundamental problems undermining effective government in New York are a lack of campaign finance reform and a mess of undemocratic rules governing the legislature. In 2004, the non-partisan Brennan Center
issued a report declaring that “New York State’s legislative process is broken” and naming it one of the worst legislatures in the country.

The Brennan Center, Citizens Union, and the New York Public Interest Research Group have noted that the lawmaking process is dominated by just a few politicians (the oft-referenced “three men in a room”: the governor, the senate majority leader, and the assembly speaker). This is encouraged by a committee system that, according to the Brennan Center, holds very few hearings, produces very few reports, and does not control its own staff.

The Center, since 2004, has offered a set of changes to restructure the legislative procedures. Among them: committees should be given control of their staffers so as to avoid being held hostage by the desires of the Majority Leader, who presently controls them; no legislator should be assigned to more than three committees so that he or she can execute committee duties thoroughly; and proxy voting should be eliminated (a very rare allowance among state legislatures, especially “professional” legislatures like New York’s.

NYPIRG has noted the drastic difference in money allocated to majority members versus minority members for expenditures on staff, travel, office supplies, and so on, and the Brennan Center has proposed a variety of solutions for additional procedural problems such as the majority leader’s control over the legislative calendar and the leader’s ability to place indefinite and unilateral holds on bills. These bizarre procedures are not common among state governments and severely impair the democratic participation of all legislators, reserving near total control for chamber leaders.

Outside of the State House, these lawmakers are easily bought by special interests (Tom Golisano) because of New York’s weak campaign finance rules and lax enforcement. As a result, money has a tight grip on the legislature, especially on its most powerful members, and the rules governing both chambers preclude meaningful debate on any issue not pre-approved by the leadership. Is it any wonder that such a corrupt system fails to attract smart, serious legislators instead of self-serving crooks and those who can buy them?

LUCKILY, POLICIES are available to solve these problems. States like Arizona and Maine have already instituted public campaign funding (as has New York City)—a solution that could end the New York legislature’s allegiance to wealthy interests as well. Rhode Island initiated this process by mandating in its constitution that

the general assembly shall adopt limitations on all contributions to candidates for election to state and local office in any primary, general or special election and shall provide for the adoption of a plan of voluntary public financing and limitations on total campaign expenditures of campaigns for governor and such other general officers as the general assembly shall specify.

Other states have pursued campaign finance reform through other avenues, providing a variety of examples from which New Yorkers could easily build their own policies.

The Brennan Center has provided comprehensive recommendations for reforming legislative rules. Currently, these rules are neither statutory nor Constitutional, but are instituted by state legislators. The chamber can easily be made more transparent and more democratic by requiring the publication of reports about upcoming legislation, the equal allocation of resources to all members regardless of party or seniority, and the restriction of leaders’ ability to push through unread bills. Legislators have repeatedly declined, or failed, to make serious changes to legislative rules as well as to campaign finance. After all, it is not in their interest to usher in a new era of transparency when the voters might not like what they see.

If New York’s citizens want a legislature that actually represents them, they may have to rewrite the rules themselves. New York state’s constitution requires that the option to hold a constitutional convention be placed before the electorate every twenty years and any other time the legislature sees fit. If citizens vote for a convention, they then elect district and at-large delegates who convene in Albany to revise the constitution.

This is not a particularly radical solution: a convention was last held in 1967, although the results were rejected by New York voters and the existing constitution remains the result of a 1938 convention. The ability of the electorate to reject a revised constitution is an important safeguard against the hijacking of the convention by culture warriors or anti-environmental business interests. But in the current climate of political disgust, New Yorkers may seize the opportunity to rewrite the document and heed the guidance of good government groups. Rhode Island’s example shows that campaign finance reform can begin with the constitution, and while it is unorthodox to address legislative rules in a constitution, it would be wise to enshrine certain principles there–such as the equal distribution of resources and strong, independent committees.

Now that the legislators have successfully convened to pass some of the most urgent pieces of legislation affecting New York counties, voters should demand that they place a constitutional convention on the ballot. Legislators have proven unwilling to institute reforms themselves, and through a convention New York voters could engage with their state government in a process of civic improvement and reclamation. New Yorkers might even begin to feel like citizens again, rather than spectators of a sordid drama beyond their control.

Until citizens demand the opportunity to rework the fundamentals of New York’s government, we can expect Albany to remain a political circus dedicated to providing first-rate representation to Tom Golisano.

 

Sarah Leonard is an intern at Dissent and a student at Columbia University.

Photo: Senators Dean Skelos and Pedro Espada (Matt Ryan/Creative Commons)