estimates that, without SALT, the United States will spend about $100 billion more for strategic weapons over the next decade and a half. At any given moment, everyone will be less secure.

It is not only in Washington and Moscow, Dallas and Kiev that observers will be watching the progress of SALT II. Shortly before Carter's Annapolis speech, Hungarian politicians were reported by Washington Post correspondent Michael Dobbs to be "particularly uneasy about the uncertainty over SALT. It is believed here [Budapest] that if the Soviet Union were to feel its security in any way challenged, it would immediately seek to reimpose a monolithic orthodoxy on Eastern Europe."

It is hard to exaggerate the watershed quality of this modest treaty, for those who yearn for liberalization in Moscow's sphere of influence as well as those who just want to enjoy the basic human right of survival.

David Bromwich

Solzhenitsyn and Freedom of the Press

A curious feature of Solzhenitsyn's Commencement Speech at Harvard (National Review, July 7, 1978) is its attack on freedom of the press. The untoward liberties that American journalists are known to take have been shocking to Solzhenitsyn, and he responds with something between petulance and indignation. He leaves his listeners uncertain whether he has really thought about, or understood, the interdependence of liberties and liberty as such. And in contrasting Soviet repression with American freedom, he exhibits what must strike his listeners as a weird nostalgia for one element in the Soviet system:

By what law has [the American press] been elected and to whom is it responsible? In the Communist East, a journalist is frankly appointed as a state official. But who has granted Western journalists their power, for how long a time, and with what prerogatives?

In the East the press is censored but at any rate knows its place; in the West it is responsible to no one, and has become an ungovernable power.

"Legally," Solzhenitsyn adds, "your researches are free, but they are conditioned by the fashion of the day. There is no open violence such as in the East; however,"—in short, the violence we do to freedom is better concealed but equally pervasive, and Solzhenitsyn has come to tear away the veil. His iconoclasm, however, is less original than he supposes: a decade ago we heard exactly the same criticism of America from Herbert Marcuse—who even gave a name, Repressive Tolerance, to the manipulation of public opinion that Solzhenitsyn now loudly and audibly laments. Solzhenitsyn also shares Marcuse's unqualified revulsion from "publicity," "TV stupor," and "intolerable music": an "invasion" whose effects both men are led to exaggerate by their exceedingly abstract knowledge of the invader. In most respects, of course, Solzhenitsyn and Marcuse could hardly be more different from each other, yet they have in common a fairly obvious personal trait—a commanding need for isolation. Neither of them has seen much of America and both are astonishingly without curiosity about it. More than a century ago de Tocqueville, who was gifted with great curiosity, wrote with comparable suspicion about public opinion in America but came to a different conclusion about the importance of our freedoms. Let us affirm—with all deference to the moral, religious, and political cant that fills our lives—that this sliding analogy between the "open violence" of totalitarianism and the "however-violence" of republican democracy is the worst cant we know. The difference between total repression and voluntary adherence to fashion is a difference in kind.

If we had to say why Solzhenitsyn finds himself among the critics of freedom of the press, we might point to a single intellectual limitation that runs through his life: he seems incapable of distinguishing strength of character from the strength of a principle. He believes that great souls are formed by the contest of courage with intense suffering. He clearly regards himself as such a soul, and he is. But when he tells us that "through intense suffering [Russia] has now achieved a spiritual development of such intensity that the Western system in its present state of spiritual exhaustion does not look attractive"—we reply that his work more than
anything else has convinced us that this is not so, that in Russia the spirit itself is laid waste, for all but a few lucky survivors. Solzhenitsyn has lived to tell the tale; but of the reason for his survival he appears to have a very imperfect understanding. He was not given asylum in recognition of his great soul, or his art, or the strength of character that helped him to live and write. He was rescued by a principle, the principle of freedom of speech. His attack on another highly visible beneficiary of that principle should be most disturbing to those who have been the greatest admirers of his courage.

Henri Rabasseire

Ghosts of the Cold War

Ghosts of the past haunt the political scene. Epithets like “cold war,” “isolationism,” and “ appeasement” are heard again. While the Administration is trying to normalize relations with China or to find ways of accommodation with the future rulers of Africa, it hears charges from all sides: that it is selling Taiwan down the river, abandoning our allies in Africa, “playing the China card,” which may provoke the Russians, and that its dilly-dallying between moderates and guerrillas in Africa may yet lose us the last chance to catch up with history on that continent.

Carter finds himself pretty much in the same quandary that Truman did 30 years ago: on the one side, the patriots accused him of “losing” China; on the other, Henry Wallace charged that he was missing the peace bus to Moscow. George Kennan, who had originally formulated the policy of “containment,” now opposed the military implementation of that policy (NATO and German rearmament). Walter Lippmann, who had coined the term “cold war,” gave Truman his candid advice to name Thomas Dewey secretary of state and then to resign so that a hopelessly compromised regime could be replaced speedily by the inevitable winner of the coming election.

It is in a similar situation that one of the thinkers of that generation now offers his reflections on world politics, a summary of his life’s experience. In an essay published earlier this year in Encounter, and also in a book entitled, The Cloud of Danger (New York: Little Brown, 1978), Mr. Kennan claims that the world-political theater is significantly different today from the one he analyzed in his famous “Mr. X” article of 1948: Stalin, the villain of that generation, has been dead for many years; the new Soviet leaders have allowed the dictatorship to soften and are concerned with the consolidation of their power sphere rather than its further expansion; Europe has recovered (as Mr. X indeed had hoped it would), and the rivalry between the superpowers has led to a new balance in whose preservation they have a common interest. Wise policies of détente have made it possible to negotiate the settlement of important issues without any military confrontation. Among these are the U.S. withdrawal from East Asia, the Helsinki and Berlin accords (recognizing Stalin’s conquests of World War II, but setting a limit to further Soviet encroachments on Western Europe), the test stop and the nonproliferation agreement, the understanding on temporary limitations of strategic weapons, and the ongoing talks on more definite restraints.

Finally, Mr. Kennan states that the Soviet leaders have no desire to make war on the West or use force in expanding their sphere of domination elsewhere. They are in dire need, however, of Western know-how and technology, and therefore should be amenable to an era of good feeling—provided we extend to them a few more billion dollars’ credit, refrain from insisting on fulfillment of the Helsinki undertakings to the letter, and don’t get overly alarmed by their activities in the Third World.

Such a listing of the price for peace is apt to arouse the patriotic anger of some and the expert censure of others. Does the Soviet Union not owe us some $50 billion that we already have contributed—foolishly—to its expansion? Has it not fostered sedition and war in countries near and far? The recent coups in Afghanistan, Mauretania, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, the guerrilla wars in Africa must all be traced to Soviet arms deliveries, and 30,000 Cubans would not be in Africa without Russian support. The Soviet empire, far from liberalizing its system, shocks the world once again with show trials, and moreover there are signs of